The Battle off Samar
A modern retelling of David and Goliath in one of the most one-sided engagements of the Second World War.
The Japanese flagship Yamato under attack by US carrier aircraft
By the autumn of 1944 the fortunes of war were decidedly against the Axis powers. The Second Front had been opened and the Germans were being pushed back into their prewar borders on both the Western and Eastern Fronts. In the Pacific, the Japanese were being pushed back, and now the United States was beginning its campaign to liberate the Philippines.
The mighty Imperial Japanese Navy had never fully recovered from its defeat at Midway in 1942, but still possessed a strong force capable of disrupting the American landings. The plan was designated 翔一号 (Sho-ichi-Go): Victory Plan One.
This plan had the Northern Force, including some of the last Japanese carriers, positioned to bait the powerful US Third Fleet under Admiral Halsey away from the Philippines. Then the Center Force under Admiral Takeo Kurita, consisting of five battleships, twelve cruisers and fifteen destroyers, would attack from the southwest, sailing through the San Bernardino Strait and engaging the invasion forces in the Philippine Sea. They would also be supported by the Southern Force attacking from the Surigao Strait.
Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita
On October 20, 1944 US forces commenced amphibious landings on Leyte, and Sho-ichi-Go was initiated by the IJN command. Admiral Kurita’s Center Force sortied out from their base at Brunei, and as they approached Palawan Island they were sighted by US submarines. They were engaged by the USS Darter (SS-227) and USS Dace (SS-247), at dawn, hitting the cruisers Atago, Takeo and Maya. Takeo was damaged and forced to turn back to Brunei, taking two destroyers with her as escort. Maya took four torpedo hits, exploded, and sank in just five minutes. Kurita’s flagship Atago likewise took four torpedoes, causing her to quickly capsize and sink. The Admiral was forced to take to the water, and was rescued and transferred his flag to Yamato. This small first encounter did not pose a promising start to Sho-ichi-Go.
Center Force just after leaving Brunei
As they entered the Sibuyan Sea on the October 24, the Japanese were again attacked, this time by US carrier planes. Yamato was lightly damaged, and her sister ship, the Mushashi, was sunk. Several other Japanese ships were damaged, and Kurita was forced to change course. This course of action led in Admiral Halsey to believe that the threat had been abated, and thus the Third Fleet moved to concentrate on the Northern Force and its critical carriers, but Kurita was not ready to abort Sho-ichi-Go yet. The Japanese turned back toward their targets and resumed course, the Americans now moving away and unaware that their enemy was not yet beaten.
The Mushashi burns as American bombs impact around her in the Sibuyan Sea
In the predawn hours of October 25 Center Force exited the San Bernardino Strait and steamed south toward Samar, which they would round to engage the US landing forces at Leyte. As they approached, they encountered the only American force left in the area: a small force of light escort carriers and destroyers called Taffy 3, commanded by Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague.
Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague
“All of a sudden, appearing on the radar screen was this blot, bigger than a silver dollar.”
Sprague was caught off guard by the sudden appearance of a massive force of Japanese capitol ships just after 0600 hours, and ordered his escort carriers to launch all their aircraft and retreat while ordering his three destroyers and four destroyer escorts to make smoke to cover the carriers. Kurita, for his part, believed he had encountered a carrier force of the Third Fleet, which in reality had taken the bait and left to pursue the Northern Force. He ordered his fleet to commence a general attack, authorizing the ships of his command to attack freely.
The closest US ship was the Fletcher Class destroyer USS Johnston (DD-557), and her skipper, Commander Ernest Evans, ordered flank speed, engaging the Japanese cruiser Kumano with torpedoes and 5 inch guns. The destroyer fired more than 200 shells into the enemy cruiser, damaging her bridge and blasting off her bow, forcing her to withdraw. Admiral Sprague then ordered the other ships of Taffy 3 to engage the enemy warships, with the destroyers USS Hoel (DD-533) and USS Heermann (DD-532) attacking alongside the destroyer escort USS Samuel B. Roberts (DE-413). Hoel immediately engaged the Kongo, despite a hit destroying her bridge, and fired her torpedoes, missing the Japanese battleship but forcing her to take evasive action and break off from the US carriers. Several more hits disabled her gun directors, several guns, her steering control, and her port engines. The badly wounded destroyer then turned to engage Yamato and Haruna, two Japanese battleships, firing a volley of torpedoes at the Yamato. She then proceeded to perform evasive action and draw fire from the Japanese ships, finally succumbing to her wounds at 0855, when the twisted hulk capsized and sank.
USS Johnston (DD-557)
As this happened, the Johnston came under fire from the battleship Kongo, and took six hits, destroying her bridge and disabling her steering engines and aft turrets. A wounded Commander Evans moved to conn the ship from her aft steering platform, engaging the Kongo before engaging a Japanese cruiser that had attacked the escort carrier USS Gambier Bay (CVE-73). Soon she broke off again to engage Japanese destroyers that were making a move against the carriers. The badly damaged Johnston moved to “cross the T” on the enemy force, which was moving in column formation, allowing them to engage them with a broadside. The wounded destroyer held out as long as she could, but damaged and under fire by five Japanese destroyers, her engines failed. The Johnston was pummeled by the Japanese destroyers, and at 0945 Commander Evans orders his crew to abandon ship. He went down with his ship shortly afterward, and was posthumously awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.
The USS Heermann and a destroyer escort making smoke
“This will be a fight against overwhelming odds from which survival cannot be expected. We will do what damage we can.”
The destroyer escort USS Samuel B. Roberts engaged the Japanese cruiser Chōkai with torpedoes, despite taking a hit to her mast, which had fallen on and disabled her torpedo launcher, This was cleared, and torpedoes were fired, registering at least one hit and slowing the enemy warship. As Roberts retreated back towards the carriers, she spotted the cruiser Chikuma moving to fire a broadside at them, and Lt. Commander Copeland, the skipper of the Roberts, ordered his crew to engage with cruiser with a broadside. The faster American ship was able to outmaneuver the larger Japanese vessel, and her faster firing 5 inch guns would expend almost all of the 600 shells in her magazines. While the Roberts attacked, the destroyer USS Heermann enaged the cruiser from the other side, and several shells hit the Japanese cruiser’s bridge, destroying it.
Soon the Chikuma’s superstructure was ablaze, and one of her forward gun turrets had been disabled. Despite this progress, the Roberts then found herself under fire from the Yamato: the most powerful battleship ever constructed. In addition, two more Japanese cruisers were engaging the diminutive American ship. Three shells from the battleship Kongo blasted open the rear compartments of the Roberts and disabled her engines. Water cascaded in, and soon the Roberts, known to history as “The Destroyer Escort that Fought Like a Battleship”, was swallowed by the sea.
The Japanese flagship Yamato, the largest and most powerful battleship ever constructed
Meanwhile, the escort carriers desperately attempted to ready their meager planes to join the defense, while the aircraft from the carriers of Taffy 1 and Taffy 2 also prepared to aid their comrades. Intended to provide support to the invasion forces and perform anti-submarine patrols, the aircraft available were armed with depth charges and light weapons, and were devoid of modern fighters, using older Wildcats instead. This would prove not to be an issue, however, as the Japanese had no fighters of any kind, the lack of heavy ordinance would be a greater factor here.
Wildcat fighters on the deck of the USS Kitkun Bay (CVE-71), as Japanese shells land around her sister ship USS White Plains (CVE-66)
The USS Gambier Bay (CVE-73) was at the rear of the retreating formation, and took several direct hits from the Japanese warships, capsizing and sinking at around 0911 after being engaged by the Yamato at close range.
Despite all this, Admiral Kurita was unnerved by the ferocity of the American resistance. Although the exact reason remains a mystery, the Japanese fleet disengaged from the battle, retreating back toward the north. It seems likely that the reason is that Kurita became aware that the Southern Force had been destroyed by strong American forces, and believed that Halsey’s fleet was coming to meet the Center Force. He may have turned north to engage the incoming US Third Fleet, but when they did not arrive he retreated back through the San Bernardino Strait. It is also possible that he assumed Taffy 3 was backed up by more powerful forces, compelling him to abort his mission before the remainder of his force, comprising most of the remaining Japanese surface fleet, was destroyed.
Taffy 3 was not in the clear yet, however, as land based Japanese aircraft were ordered into the air for a mass Kamikaze attack against the American ships.
An A6M Zero commences a kamikaze attack on the USS White Plains (CVE-66)
The kamikaze attacks were of marginal success. The USS Kitkun Bay shot down the Japanese plane headed for it, causing minor damage, while two headed for USS Fanshaw Bay, with one shot down but still hitting the ship with light damage and the other shot down over the sea. Another struck a glancing blow to the USS White Plains, while a final plane aimed for the USS St. Lo. This aircraft hit the escort carrier directly, detonating the aviation fuel tanks in her hangar. This caused a massive hire which detonated the magazine containing aviation bombs, tearing the carrier apart. She sank within thirty minutes.
The USS St. Lo explodes after being hit by a kamikaze
The Battle off Samar was one of the most one sided engagements of the Second World War, with the vastly outmatched Taffy 3 successfully resisting the most powerful force the Imperial Japanese Navy could muster. For this they lost two destroyers, one destroyer escort and two escort carriers in exchange for three Japanese cruisers sunk, another three damaged along with a destroyer damaged.
The United States suffered over 1,500 casualties, many of whom died in the water awaiting rescue, as fear of submarine attacks and misreported positions delayed rescue by two days, with many falling victim to sharks and exposure.
Survivors are taken aboard a friendly ship
“For extraordinary heroism in action against powerful units of the Japanese Fleet during the Battle off Samar, Philippines, October 25, 1944. ... the gallant ships of the Task Unit waged battle fiercely against the superior speed and fire power of the advancing enemy, ... two of the Unit’s valiant destroyers and one destroyer escort charged the battleships point-blank and, expending their last torpedoes in desperate defense of the entire group, went down under the enemy’s heavy shells as a climax to two and one half hours of sustained and furious combat. The courageous determination and the superb teamwork of the officers and men who fought the embarked planes and who manned the ships of Task Unit 77.4.3 were instrumental in effecting the retirement of a hostile force threatening our Leyte invasion operations and were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.”
For their actions at the Battle off Samar, Taffy 3 was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation, one Congressional Medal of Honor to Commander Ernest Evans of the USS Johnston, 28 Navy Crosses, two Silver Stars and two Bronze Stars.
The Battle off Samar ended the career of Admiral Kurita. Blamed for the failure of the operation and targeted for not fighting to the death, he was reassigned as commandant of the Imperial Naval Academy, and retired after the war. He died in 1977, having rarely spoke about his actions during the war.
It would also represent a crushing defeat for Imperial Japan, as the failure to interrupt the landings at Leyte led to the liberation of the Philippines, and the lost ships could not be replaced by the Japanese at that stage of the war, nor could the damaged ships be repaired. This was especially true as the Philippines fell and served to cut the sea lanes between the Japanese bases and the home islands. The surface fleet of the IJN was further crippled, and would no longer be capable of major actions in the South Pacific.
Fleet Compositions
Center Force - Imperial Japanese Navy - Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita
Battleships
IJN Yamato* - Yamato Class
IJN Nagato - Nagato Class (Lightly damaged)
IJN Kongō - Kongō Class
IJN Haruna - Kongō Class
Cruisers
IJN Chōkai - Takao Class (Sunk)
IJN Haguro - Myōkō Class (Lightly Damaged)
IJN Kumano - Mogami Class (Badly Damaged)
IJN Suzuya - Mogami Class (Sunk)
IJN Tone - Tone Class
IJN Chikuma - Tone Class (Sunk)
11 Destroyers
Task Force 77.4.3 (Taffy 3) - United States Navy - Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague
Destroyers
USS Heermann (DD-532) - Fletcher Class (Damaged)
USS Hoel (DD-533) - Fletcher Class (Sunk)
USS Johnston (DD-557) - Fletcher Class (Sunk)
Destroyer Escorts
USS John C. Butler (DE-339) - John C. Butler Class (Lightly Damaged)
USS Raymond (DE-341) - John C. Butler Class
USS Dennis (DE-405) - John C. Butler Class (Damaged)
USS Samuel B. Roberts (DE-413) - (Sunk)
Escort Carriers
USS St. Lo (CVE-63) - Casablanca Class (Sunk)
USS White Plains (CVE-66) - Casablanca Class (Damaged)
USS Kalinin Bay (CVE-68) - Casablanca Class (Damaged)
USS Fanshaw Bay* (CVE-70) - Casablanca Class (Lightly Damaged)
USS Kitkun Bay (CVE-71) - Casablanca Class
USS Gambier Bay (CVE-73) - Casablanca Class (Sunk)
* signifies the flagship of the respective fleets
Sources
Sources listed in order or importance
Hornfischer, James D. - The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors: The Extraordinary World War II Story of the US Navy’s Finest Hour
US Naval History and Heritage Command
Dogfights: Death of the Japanese Navy, The History Channel, 2006
Wikipedia - Battle off Samar