Tuesday, August 25
The Germans Prepare for Another Counterattack
A German car stopped at a roadblock in East Prussia
In the early morning hours of 25 August the German intelligence officers at Kongisberg intercepted a radio message from the Russian 1st Army amounting to a full daily order. According to the intercept, General Rennenkampf intended for his troops to advance only as far as Gerdaum-Allenburg-Wehlev, leaving them too far away to link up with the 2nd Army. The possibility remains that this is a feint, but never the less serves to embolden the Germans, with the possibility that their worst fear may not be realized.
In stark contrast to the effectiveness of German intelligence at intercepting Russian radio and telephone communications, the Russians were remarkably lackluster in their attempts at same. Indeed, uncensored German mail, captured days prior, had not been opened, much less read and analyzed for information on German strengths and positions.
A German column moves through a town
With the information regarding the movements of the Russian 1st Army, Hindenburg met with Francois in Montowo, where the 8th Army commander informed the commander of I Corps that he was to take his men and attack the Russians at Usdau at 0500. Francois was unhappy with this order, as his forces were still not fully in position. Ammunition supplies had ve not been replenished, and the corps artillery was still en route to the new deployment area. In response to the orders, Francois quipped:
“If it has been ordered, naturally an attack will be made. Of course, the men must fight with bayonets.”
As his forces moved into position, the plans were laid for I Corps to attack the Russians from the Seeben Heights, from their pushing on to Usdau. This would require crossing a river as well as open farmland crisscrossed by Russian positions. To make matters worse, Russian cavalry had spotted the buildup of the German I Corps, and as a result Samsonov had reinforced the Russian I Corps, which was facing it along the line. Russian forces have been spotted by German aircraft massing at Mlawa, and some of these men are ordered by Samsonov to reinforce the Russian I Corps, whose commander, General Artamonov, was not considered reliable by the 2nd Army commander. This is to include the elite 3rd Guards Division, just arrived from Warsaw, but none of the reinforcements can arrive within 48 hours.
The German XVII Corps, meanwhile, was finally getting itself back into order after Gumbinnen. From the corps area at Gross Schwansfeld, General von Mackensen contacted Ludendorff, requesting clarification of standing orders for his forces. Orders are prompt from the Chief of Staff: both XVII Corps and I Reserve Corps are to march at best speed toward Bischofsburg to stop the Russians from taking the town. Thus begins a long march in the blistering August heat over the dirt roads that stretch through the East Prussian forests. In a march of over 34 miles, the Germans make it to their jumpoff positions, even as horses drop dead along the roadsides. Mackensen and Below hold a joint conference in the evening, deciding that XVII Corps will attack the Russians on the right, I Reserve Corps the right. Lakes Dodey and Gross-Lauten are designated as the barrier between the two forces.
At 1200 Mackensen had received an order to divert his forces to block the Russian 1st Army in the north, but elected to disregard it in favor of his spoken orders from Ludendorff. In the end the plan is for XVII Corps to attack at 0700, moving with all possible haste to take Bischofsburg, while I Reserve Corps attacks at 1000 in support. A miscommunication, however, leaves Mackensen under the impression that Below will move at 0700.
Samsonov, for his part, noting the movements of the German I Corps, ordered his main force to press westward toward Allenstein, with only a small screening force left at Bischofsburg. Communications between Samsonov and general Blagoveschensky, commander of the VI Corps in that area, had broken down, and thus runners had to be used despite the great distance between the two headquarters.
Russian troops crowd a railway station
Russian VI Corps had occupied Bischofsburg with elements of the 16th Infantry Division in the morning, with the 4th Infantry Division nearby at Rothfliess. Furthermore, the 4th Cavalry Division was stationed in Sensburg, but all three divisions were badly understrength. Straggling was becoming a major problem, as tired men fell behind on the long marches and got lost in the woods, and even though most eventually caught up to their units, the situation was still severe.
Moreover, the Russian cavalry at Sensburg was under the direct command of 2nd Army, and essentially static, depriving VI Corps of reconnaissance screens that might have noted the two German corps marching toward them. Thus unaware, the only forces General Blagoveschensky had in the path of the Germans was a single brigade at Lauten. Furthermore, beleiving as did Samsonov that the Germans were reeling westward toward the Vistula, he ordered the 16th Infantry Division to march on Allenstein to prevent a loss of contact with the rest of the Army.
East Prussia: 25 August, 1914
Fortress City of Konigsberg
German XVII Corps and I Reserve Corps positions
Montowo - German I Corps Positon
Ortelsburg
Bischofsburg - Russian 16th Division
Seeburg - Russian cavalry position
Mlawa Road - Russian reinforcements from Warsaw moving to reinforce 2nd Army