Saturday, August 22
Enter Hindenburg and Ludendorf
As the week came to a close, so did General von Prittwitz’ tenure in command of the German 8th Army. His apparent loss of nerve after the defeat at Gumbinnen, despite having seemingly passed, had resulted in a loss of confidence in the headquarters of the OHL in Koblenz. A new, younger and more aggressive commander was needed in the eyes of Moltke and his staff, and the fighting in Belgium had recently called to light just such a man.
General Erich Ludendorff had led the charge that had broken the Belgian fortifications at Liege, and was hailed as a hero throughout Germany for his actions in that battle. A prickly personality had kept him out of the inner circles of power in peacetime, but newly won status and the dire situation in the east left him as a strong contender. In addition, he was merely a Deputy Chief of Staff with the German 2nd Army, and thus was more easily replaced during the ongoing campaign in the west.
A telegram was sent to Ludendorf at 0900, ordering him to report immediately to OHL at Koblenz for reassignment.
Despite all of this, Ludendorff was only to replace General Alfred von Waldersee as Chief of Staff of the 8th Army. Prittwitz was to be replaced with another man, one who was hoped to be a calming influence on Ludendorff, as well as being able to work with him effectively. After a search, they arrive at a perfect solution.
General Paul von Hindenburg, a retired career officer, had offered his services to the Kaiser when the war began. Famously imperturbable, Hindenburg had had a long if uneventful career, including drafting initial plans for the defense of East Prussia in 1898, leaving him generally familiar with the terrain and situation in the region. It likely did not hurt that he was located directly along the rail line to East Prussia that Ludendorff would take, in Hanover.
The Kaiser was not impressed with either selection, responding that Hindenburg was “simple minded”, while Ludendorff was a “Jumped up technician lacking in social skills” (Showalter, p,222). Despite this, Wilhelm II had even by this point been effectively sidelined by the OHL, and spends most of his time sulking while offering occasional dejected commentary.
Ludendorff spent some time in Koblenz, where he informed a shocked Moltke that unless significant reinforcements are sent east that retreat to the Vistula was the only viable option. OHL quickly sent the new Chief of Staff on his way, and sent a telegram to Hindenburg to expect the train at 0300 tomorrow. he replies simply “I am ready”.
On the frontlines in East Prussia, the retreat continued. Mackensen’s XVII Corps had by now retreated almost forty miles westward after the disaster at Gumbinnen on 20 August. In addition, Francois of I Corps reported to OHL directly that any attack on Rennenkampf’s Russian 1st Army was no longer feasible after two days of retreat.
In the south, Samsonov’s Russian 2nd Army continued its attack against the line held by the German XX Corps. Russian forces had entered Neidenburg in the morning, encountering only scattered German rearguards before Cossack units take the town. A surprise attack by German bicycle troops later liberated the town (stopping later the eat the fresh lunch prepared for the recently retreated Russians) before the Germans withdrew in the afternoon. In response to the ease of taking Neidenburg, Samsonov altered his plans, diverting troops further west to lengthen his line even more in order to encircle the Germans.