Monday, August 17
The Steamroller Arrives
General von Francois in Neidenburg
The Great War had broken out on July 28, when the Austro-Hungarian Empire had declared war on Serbia following a month of internal and international crisis following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Hapsburg throne, in Sarajevo. The first shots were fired just after midnight on 29 July, as Austrian ships bombarded Belgrade from the Danube. This event set in motion a series of events that rapidly expanded what the Austrians had hoped to be a small regional conflict into the largest and most destructive in history up to that point.
An Austrian monitor on the Danube
The Russian Empire, eager to come to the aid of their fellow Slavs in the Balkans as well as to regain prestige lost in the disastrous 1905 war with Japan, commenced full mobilization on July 30, prompting the Germans to issue a declaration of war on 1 August and mobilize as well. In accordance with their alliance with Russia, the French also mobilized, and the Germans set the Schlieffen Plan into motion, invading Luxembourg and Belgium as well as France in order to knock out the Western powers before the Tsar’s armies were mobilized.
Crowds listen to Kaiser Wilhelm II issue the German declaration of war
The much vaunted “Russian Steamroller” was, however, already on the way. The forces of the Imperial Russian Army’s Northwestern Front were mobilized along the Baltic coast and in Russian Poland, and despite the grand plans of the Austrians for an offensive into Poland via Galicia the main Russian force, and the focus of the Eastern Front in general in the late summer of 1914, was to be directed against East Prussia.
Small German units had actually crossed the border as early as 31 July, retrieving a poster ordering mobilization for intelligence purposes. These men, like most of the East Prussian garrison, were scattered around the countryside as usual to aid in the harvest, and when Kriegsgefahr (war danger) status was declared they were hurriedly recalled to their garrisions for deployment.
These deployments were in four strategic zones across the territory:
The Kongisberg Zone included the fortress city itself along the Baltic coast as well as the surrounding area from Labiau to Tapiau. The defenses here are to be concentrated on the Deime River, which is too deep to ford and has sparse bridges protected by pre-built positions. The city itself was surrounded by a belt of modern fortresses as well as being in a position for both easy resupply and reinforcement by sea as well as within range of supporting fire from the powerful guns of the Kaiserliche Marine’s Baltic Fleet.
The Insterburg Gap was the location of the 8th Army’s main defensive line, following the Angerapp River on its higher western bank. The territory here is marked by scattered forests with small lakes and swamps mixed with villages and open farmland.
The Masurian Lakes were a chain of small lakes interspersed with forests. The only major road through the area is blocked by Fort Boyen, with its garrision.
The Johannesburg-Soldau Sector, with its dense forest was defensible due to the fact that movement of large forces off-road was essentially impossible, allowing defenders to bottleneck and ambush any invaders.
German cavalry parade through Berlin before heading to the front
As mentioned, the main defensive line of the 8th Army was to be located along the Angerapp River, with the army’s units deployed thus:
I Corps (von Francois) - Gumbinnen and Insterburg
XVII Corps (von Macnkensen) - Soldau [en route from Danzig]
XX Corps (von Scholtz) - Allenstein and the southwestern border
I Reserve Corps (von Below) - Nordenburg and Angerburg
3rd Reserve Divsion - Thorn Fortress
German reconnaissance flights by both Zeppelins and Taube monoplanes had begun on 2 August, but mobilization had generally disrupted the German intelligence services, and information about Russian movements was scant and often contradictory in early August. Reports of Russian movements around Narew had been increasing, with large forces reported there by 13 August. The blow was soon to fall, but not all was well within the German ranks.
General Herman von Francois, commander of I Corps, had long been adamant that the plan to hold along the Angerapp was unacceptable, as it surrendered a substantial ammount of East Prussia to the Russians. His lobbying had ensured the allocation of additional machine guns to his force, and had, on his own initiative, advanced his forces almost to the border, with a line running from Goldapp to Stallupönen. When 8th Army headquarters learned of this, General von Prittwitz ordered von Francois to dig in to flank an anticipated Russian move to his south. As Russian forces appear further north, however, Francois initiates a tactical withdrawal, after a brief exchange of artillery fire.
A German Taube monoplane in 1914
On August 17, as Francois is inspecting the forward positions of the 1st Division, the Russian attack begins, with reports of significant Russian incursions around Stallupönen. Francois himself rushes to the steeple of the village church to observe the battle, further ordering that his heavy howitzers be brought up quickly from Gumbinnen. As he watches the battle, some locals begin to ring the church bells to warn the residents, much to the discomfort of the officers in the belfry.
As the day progresses, the German 1st Division soon finds itself facing three Russian divisions, all of which are attacking in a piecemeal manner along the German line. By midday the German howitzers were in position and providing supporting fire against the Russians, even as some units began to report imminent envelopment. An attempt to organize a diversionary attack to cover a withdrawal was quickly defeated, with a Russian counterattack being stopped by a single German company, holding back a Russian force that outnumbered them five to one.
The Russians were demonstrating a great skill at concealment, using the terrain to their advantage in movements against the defenders. Despite the relative lack of effectiveness of their artillery against the well entrenched Germans, infantry were managing to flank them in several areas. Communication and coordination proves difficult for both sides, as German buglers are unheard over the din of battle, and many fall to Russian fire. Runners quickly replace them, maintaining communications as well as possible with Francois’ headquarters. The Russians likewise are encountering these problems, compounded by the fact that most of their noncommissioned officers cannot tell time, and many who do lack watches, making coordination exceedingly difficult over the wide area.
A Russian gun crew during a stop in 1914 (location unknown)
Later in the day, a runner was sent from 8th Army Headquarters to Francois, ordering him to withdraw as he was too far forward to be supported by other German forces. To this the general responded:
“Tell General von Prittwitz that General von Francois will break off the battle when the Russians are beaten.”
Despite this, reinforcements were still on the way. the German 2nd Division, also under I Corps and based at Tollminghehmen, had head the sound of distant battle and begun to march to join the fray, minus two battalions left to hold the line. This force arrived at Stalluponen at 1400, managing to flank the Russian 27th Division and trap it between them and the German 1st Division. The Russians were routed, with 3,000 prisoners taken and almost as many killed.
Despite this victory, the situation is still deteriorating for the defenders. Russian forces attacked Tollminghehmen in the afternoon, and although the Germans were holding they were in danger of being overwhelmed. In addition, Cossacks had penetrated as far as Pilkallen, and a massive force was marching on Goldap. As a result Francois ordered his corps to retreat, even as he telephoned 8th Army to report the routing of the two enemy corps. The insubordination throughout the day left von Prittwitz wanting to relieve von Francois of his command, but the dangerous situation meant that it would be too foolish to risk a crisis at this juncture.
The Russian force in the Stallupönenarea, III Corps under the command of General Nikolai Yepantschin, sent word to 1st Army headquarters proposing to resume the attack on Stalluponen at 0400 the next day, but soon after dark probing reveals the Germans have abandoned the village, with the exception of a single regiment, the 41st, in its position near Bilderweitschen.
Germans in an open position (during a pre-war exercise)
The 41st had failed to receive their orders to retreat, and thus found themselves alone in the face of the entire III Corps. The Russians set fire to the haystacks across the fields near the village to illuminate the landscape, and approached the Germans under a flag of truce to demand surrender. The Germans refused, and the 41st engaged the Russians until they ran out of ammunition. As the Russians entered Bilderweitschen the Germans fixed bayonets and engaged in hand to hand combat before breaking off and retreating. Despite their comrades beleving the regiment to have been destroyed in the day’s fighting, the 41st made it back to friendly lines in the night, even bringing thirty Russian prisoners along with them.
Thus ended the first day of the East Prussian Campaign. The Russian 1st Army had been temporarily stalled by the Germans at Stallupönen, but by now the Germans had withdrawn back toward the Angerapp. The Russian 2nd Army is known to the Germans to be located along the Narew River in Poland, but has not been seen to make major moves as of today.
East Prussia - 17 August 1914
Fortress City of Konigsberg
Bartenstein - 8th Army Headquarters
8th Army North Flank (Held by Landwehr brigades)
I Corps Left Flank
Stallupönen - I Corps Forward Position
Intsterburg - I Corps “official” position
Angerapp Line - I Reserve Corps
Fort Boyen - 3rd Reserve Division
XX Corps Main Position
XX Corps Right Flank
Russian 1st Army
Russian 2nd Army