Friday, August 28
The Day of Decision
At 0700 on 28 August Hindenburg and the rest of the 8th Army Headquarters arrived in the village of Frogenau, setting up in a local creamery. The town was also the headquarters of XX Corps, which was continuing its attack of the day before against the Russian 2nd Army. As stated the previous day by Ludendorff, this was to be the “day of decision”.
Along the western flank, the German I Corps launched its attack at 0600, with Francois boasting 120 guns to support him, the largest such concentration yet seen in the East Prussian Campaign. The first objective of the corps was to cut the road to Neidenburg, and soon Soldau was taken with only token Russian resistance. After a report from aerial reconnaissance that the Russians were pulling back from Mlawa, leaving Francois to move to take Neidenburg itself. Despite these victories, the defeat of the 41st Division at Waplitz had worried Ludendorff, who ordered Francois to shift his attack toward Lahna as well as detaching some reserves to shore up the Waplitz sector.
Francois, however, once again defied his orders. The road toward Lahna was narrow and through dense woods, and although he did order the 1st Division to stop for rest, thereby leaving them in position to move to assist near Waplitz. The rest of his corps continued onward toward Neidenburg, and when the situation began to stabilize in the early afternoon he was vindicated, ordering the 1st Division to rejoin the march.
By 1900 I Corps entered Neidenburg after another token show of resistance by Russian stragglers, and Francois ordered a parade through the liberated town. In a notable point, the local hospital was found to be full of wounded Germans from the previous days’ battles, who reported excellent treatment at the hands of their Russian captors.
Hours earlier in the pre-dawn darkness, the German attack had slowed as fog fell and Russian resistance stiffened. By 0415 the German 59th Infantry Regiment had established a bridgehead over the Maranz, shooting Russians who tried to surrender, but soon a counterattack had turned the bridgehead into a pocket. The commander of the enveloped troops, a Captain Bernecke, managed to escape, eventually locating the 148th Infantry Regiment and leading them to the bridge along with a platoon of pioneers (combat engineers). Upon arrival, the pioneers attempted to force the Russian perimeter around the pocket, but were wiped out.
Meanwhile, the Germans had entered Waplitz, engaging in house to house fighting with the Russians stationed there, and the 41st Division, by now exhausted and under strength, entered Adamsheide. By 0600 the fog began to lift, but Russian and German artillery soon began to shell the town, causing immense destruction as well as casualties on both sides. Reinforcements for the beleagured Germans came from Frankenau, but were unable to salvage the situation, and when the ammuniton was exhausted some 300 Germans were captured as the Russians held Waplitz. The 41st Division, no barely holding together, pulled out through the narrow gap in the Russian lines near Lake Maranz, covered by their field guns. In all, 2,400 casualties were sustained this morning by the 41st.
At 0700 the 3rd Reserve Division under the command of General von Morgen attacked toward Muhlen. Despite a lack of artillery, Drobnitz fell to the 5th Reserve Brigade, albeit with heavy casualties. By 1230, after a brutal fight in the Jablonken woods, the 6th Reserve Brigade was able to enter Hohenstein and engage in close quarters battle with the Russians there.
XX Corps, recovered from the debacle at Waplitz, resumed its attack at 1300, sending the wounded 41st Division toward Orlau and the 3rd Reserve Division to Kurken, although the 41st Reserve division was ultimately too badly mauled to execute these orders. The reservists, however, are able to push forward, rescuing the 41st Division wounded they encounter as they push the Russians back toward Orlau. By the evening the Russian XV Corps was on the brink of total collapse in the sector.
In another area, the German Landwehr forces brought in from the west, under General Freiherr von der Goltz, launched their own attack, but soon found themselves under heavy fire, both from the Russians around Kammerei and the artillery of the German 37th Division, now deployed around Hohenstein. In response to requests to stop the friendly fire, Goltz was simply told to get out of the way. Russian counterattacks would eventually take Morken, splitting Goltz’ forces by nightfall.
On the eastern flank, Ostgruppe had been ordered to move out as early as possible to take Allenstein, with the I Reserve Corps moving out along the narrow forest roads at 1000, despite wanting to wait for XVII Corps, which is currently resting. As they advanced, reconnaissance reported that the Russians were retreating from Allenstein, and the reservists quickened their pace, eventually taking Allenstein in the afternoon with no resistance. By 1500 the Germans had taken Sadranz, but the Russians rallied and stopped them cold at Darethen and Darthowo, with the I Reserve Corps breaking off just before midnight.
When XVII Corps did move out, under orders to take Ortelsburg and Jadwabno at all costs. Their advance was painfully slow, as they marched on narrow, sandy roads over steep hills, encountering no major enemy forces throughout the day.
On the Russian side, the situation was rapidly developing into disaster. The XV Corps was beginning to collapse, and due to direct orders the XIII Corps was bypassing them to march on Allenstein. In order to salvage the situation, Samsonov sent word to Northwestern Front headquarters that he intended to move to XV Corps headquarters to personally restore order and command their counterattack, leaving his headquarters at 0800. Thus, until he could reestablish communications, the 2nd Army was to be without its commander. To make matters worse, it was only an hour and a half later, at 0930, that a courier found him on the road and informed him of the true severity of the defeat yesterday at Bischofsburg. Reaching XV Corps at 1100, he ordered both XV and XIII Corps to withdraw to Neidenburg as quickly as possible, placing all his hope on the town remaining in Russian hands( as mentioned, by 1900 the town had been taken by the German I Corps). The first move for XIII Corps, its rear being ravaged by the Germans by this point, to thread the needle through a narrow gap between two lakes.
In the north, reports were coming to the Germans that the 1st Army was advancing to the south, threatening the German rear. This news caused a panic Ludendorff to draft orders for all German forces to break off contact with the 2nd Army and turn northward, but Hindenburg took him aside to calm him, and the orders were never issued. In reality, most of the 1st Army was still behind the Alle River, averaging forty miles from the battlezone.
By the end of the day, the 8th Army reported to OHL that the Russian western flank had been routed back into Poland, the center was pinned, and the eastern flank was in retreat toward Poland. The battle was not yet over, but it was apparent that Samsonov’s forces were on the brink of a disaster of epic proportions.