Prelude: Under the Boot of the Empire
Manila under Japanese Occupation: January 1942 - January 1945
A Japanese soldier mans a checkpoint in front of the Legislature Building - US National Archives
After the fall of the American backed Commonwealth, the Japanese had placed a military administration in control of the islands, assisted by a collaborationist government. At first propaganda had pushed the concept of the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”, portraying themselves as liberators of fellow Asians from the yoke of Western imperialism. This program included adding Japanese language curriculum to schools, as well as an altered, pro-Japanese history. A new Peso was issued, under the control of the occupation authority and thus subject to the whims of Tokyo, and it began to rapidly inflate.
In 1943 the Japanese allowed the establishment of a puppet regime, the so-called Second Philippine Republic under President Jose Laurel. This government, led by the KALIBAPI party, furthered the goals of the Japanese occupation, but now with a veneer of local support. KALIBAPI also raised a militia to enforce its aims, and this organization, known as the Makapili, was greatly feared by the civilian population, although they were less effective against the guerrillas they were intended to oppose.
A five Peso banknote issed under the Japanese occupation. Commonly known as “Mickey-Mouse Money” due to its worthlessness, this particular note was also overprinted “The Co-Prosperity Sphere: what is it worth?”, by US forces, who dropped these notes as a propaganda leaflet - Author’s Collection
In the city of Manila itself, the activities of guerillas were less widespread, but civil disobedience and passive resistance would prove to be a long term problem for the occupiers. Japanese officers transferring to the city would often fall prey to having their boots shined by children on the streets, not knowing that the banana peels used to make the polish would attract hordes of flies around the officer until he realized the issue. Petty theft was commonplace, with even the swords of Japanese officers occasionally being stolen.
The Japanese took complete control of local media, with radio stations and newspapers being subject to strict censorship, and when executives objected they were often arrested and interned. Filipinos were required to bow to every Japanese soldier they passed in the street, and even the most minor infractions by civilians were met with physical violence ranging from a backhanded slap to beatings.
Children stand near a notice of Japanse regulations for civilians - John Tewell on Flickr, colorized
In addition to the more direct problems caused by the presence of Japanese troops, the policies of the Imperial Japanese Army authorities as well as the puppet Republic set up under Jose Laurel led to further problems, most notably economic in nature. The Japanese began to issue their own version of the Peso, outlawing the use of the Commonwealth currency. This shift from the silver standard to a fiat currency controlled by the occupiers led to various issues, particularly as the new government and the Japanese attempted to exert control by printing vast quantities of money for their use. The resulting hyperinflation exacerbated issues leading from a significant shortage of consumer goods and food, and by late 1944 a small sack of rice costs an average of
₱5,000.
The looting in the final days before the Japanese entered Manila had caused a glut in the food supply, but this was followed by a perpetual shortage that came as a result of the disruption of the planting season during the Japanese invasion, and furthered by guerilla activities and (later in the war) by US submarines preventing the importation of foodstuffs and consumer goods.
Civilians are forced to construct a barricade in Manila - US National Archives
Returning to the military situation, General Yamashita had prepared for a defense of Luzon, although with little air support and no naval support, he realized that the only outcome was defeat, and thus the only logical defense strategy was to prepare to hold against a siege for as long as possible, so as to tie up as many American troops as possible and for as long as possible in order to delay the American assault on the Home Islands.
Despite the serious casualties sustained on Leyte, Yamashita still controlled a sizable force on Luzon, including more than a quarter million men and more than two hundred tanks. These forces he divided into three separate commands, each tasked with the defense of their own sector of the island. Shimbu Group, consisting of 80,000 men under the command of Lt. General Shizuo Yokoyama, was deployed to the southern part of Luzon, and tasked with its defense, also taking responsibility for the mountainous region east of Manila. A token force of this group was also tasked with maintainging order in the city itself as military infrastructure was destroyed and an evacuation of Japanese personnel commenced.
Major General Rikichi Tsukada was placed in command of the 30,000 men of Kembu Group, and ordered to defend the area directly along the path of the American advance from Lingayen Gulf toward Manila, as well as Bataan and Corregidor, site of the final stand of the American and Filipino forces in 1942. The final, and largest group, was under Yamashita’s personal command, a force of some 152,000 men designated Shobu Group. This was entrenched in the mountainous jungle of northern Luzon, centered around the city of Baguio. It was here that Yamashita intended to make his stand, and bleed the Americans white.
General Yamashita on Luzon
In the city, a flurry of activity was taking place. The puppet government had been evacuated to Baguio, although since the declaration of martial law in late 1944 it had lost any real semblance of authority anyway. Meanwhile, the Japanese were preparing to evacuate the city in compliance with the orders of General Yamashita. Engineers were preparing bridges for demolition, and convoys of trucks were removing the vast quantities of supplies located in the port warehouses to support Shobu Group’s stand to the north. Yamashita was concerned over the need to feed the civilians in a state of siege, and also felt that making a stand in an urban environment would be counterproductive to his plans to hold on in the north, not to mention the hostile attitudes of much of the populace.
A Japanese soldier stands at a pillbox at the intersection of Pinpin and Escolta. Note that he appears to be armed with a captured American M1903 Springfield rifle. - US National Archives
As the Americans approached the capitol, the Imperial Japanese Army was still in the process of evacuation, scrambling to remove the last of their supplies and equipment from the city. But at least one Japanese officer had other plans; Admiral Sanji Iwabuchi, commander of the 31st Naval Special Base Force. This unit of the Special Naval Landing Forces (SNLF, essentially Japanese marines) was under the control of the Imperial Japanese Navy, and although Iwabuchi was nominally under the control of Yamashita, as overall commander in the Philippines, interservice rivalry was fierce in Imperial Japan, and Iwabuchi greatly resented taking orders from an Army officer. In addition, Iwabuchi felt that as one of the best harbors in the Pacific, Manila needed to be vigorously defended. He argued with Yamashita over the wisdom of abandoning the city, but eventually was overruled and instead left to command the garrison as it completed it’s duties to deny valuable infrastructure to the Americans.
In order to accomplish his objective, Iwabuchi combined his SNLF troops with the small Army contingent left in the city, as well as large numbers of ad hoc formations composed of Naval admistration personnel and the crews from the large numbers of ships disabled in the harbor. In total, he was able to gather approximately 17,000 men for his Manila Naval Defense Force (MNDF), and set about fortifying the city.
One of the several Japanese ships sunken in the shallow harbor, most of which donated guns for the defense of the city, or were used as offshore batteries - US National Archives
Iwabuchi’s troops were under orders to prepare the main bridges for demolition, as well as prepare to destroy the dock facilities in the port. This they did, along with more substantial fortifications. The palm trees lining Dewey Boulevard were chopped down to allow it to be used as an emergency airstrip, and using the logs to barricade streets and construct earthworks in the parks. Rails from the streetcars are placed into holes drilled in the pavement to create tank traps, backed with barricades made with the cars themselves, as well as civilian automobiles and barbed wire. Landmines of all types were deployed across the city, including improvised versions consisting of depth charges and aircraft bombs fitted with pressure detonators and partially buried. Naval guns and anti-aircraft cannons, stripped from the disabled ships in the harbor, were emplaced around the city as well, and incendiary plans are set in motion to begin burning large sections of the city.
With the landings of the US 11th Airborne Division at Nasugbu on January 31st, Admiral Iwabuchi believed that this was intended to be the main thrust into Manila, and began to fortify the southern approaches to the city, creating a series of strong forticications called the Genko Line, which ran from Manila Bay to Laguna de Bai. It consisted of a series of pillboxes armed with machine guns, naval guns, and anti-aircraft cannons, with it’s core being Nichols Field and Fort McKinley. In addition to this strong defensive position, Iwabuchi issued orders for the old walled city, Intramuros, to be fortified, resuming its ancient role as a citadel. Finally, the reinforced concrete government buildings, such as the City Hall, Finance Building, Central Post Office, Agriculture Building, and Legislature Building were to be turned into fortresses, with the strong walls and open plazas around them making them natural defensive strongpoints.
US small arms, mostly M1917 “American Enfields” captured by the Japanese after the fall of Bataan - US National Archives
As Iwabuchi prepared for the defense of the city, one problem that presented itself for his intended fight to the death was the lack of small arms. The small Army detachment were experienced infantry, as were his 31st Naval Special Base Force, but the vast majority of his command consisted of naval crews and administrative personnel who were untrained in ground combat and often unarmed. The solution, however, was readily available, in the form of the vast stocks of American weapons and munitions captured when the archipelago fell, most of which were stored in Manila. These stocks were opened, and the weapons distributed to the Japanese sailors of the MNDF.
As the Americans approached the city from both the north and the south, MacArthur’s expectation of Manila being declared an open city, as he had done in 1941, would come to nothing. Admiral Iwabuchi and his troops intended, regardless of the wishes of General Yamashita, to fight to the death over every inch of the Pearl of the Orient.