The United States of America

The United States had begun its involvement in Vietnam during the Second World War, when the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) had provided aid to Ho Ch Minh’s Viet Minh insurgency against the Japanese occupation of the country. With the collapse of Japan in 1945 the Viet Minh had continued to operate against the restored French Colonial Administration, now opposed by the US, which provided material aid to the French as well as operations by the newly formed CIA (which replaced the OSS in 1947). With the decisive defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 Vietnam found itself divided, with the northern region controlled by the Ho Chi Minh’s communists and the south under the control of the State of Vietnam.

The Americans had replaced the French as the backers of the Saigon Government, and continued to do so even after Ngo Dinh Diem successfully overthrew Emperor Bao Dai and declared the Republic of Vietnam in 1955. Under the administration of President John F. Kennedy material aid to the RVN began to escalate in the early 1960s, with US Army special forces deploying to the country in 1961. These would be followed by an increasing number of military personal in an “advisory” role, but despite their significant increase by the time of Kennedy’s assassination the conflict had only escalated.

After a US destroyer was attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin by North Vietnamese torpedo boats in 1964 President Lyndon Johnson escalated to direct American military involvement in Vietnam, primarily concentrated on a strategic bombing campaign against the north, and a war of attrition on the ground in the south, with US and ARVN forces, along with other allies, aiming primarily to simply inflict large casualties on the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army. By the beginning of 1968, there were more than half a million Americans serving in Vietnam, having effectively supplanted the ARVN as the main belligerent of the conflict.

President Lyndon B. Johnson

Lyndon Baines Johnson had taken office as President of the United States in 1963 following the assassination of John F. Kennedy. It was under his administration that the conflict in Vietnam was escalated into the major conflict it was by 1968. A firm believer in the Domino Theory, Johnson was committed to using American military power for containment of the spread of communism in Southeast Asia, and used the Golf of Tonkin Incident to drastically increase US presence in the RVN.

Domestic support for American involvement in the war had been declining sharply since the initial outrage over Tonkin, and despite winning the Presidency for a full term in 1964 Johnson’s administration was increasingly embattled over the conduct of the war. The bombing campaigns were showing little fruit, and casualties mounted as communist aggression did. Offers were made in 1967 for negotiations to begin with Hanoi, but these were rejected, with Ho Chi Minh’s government refusing to entertain any possibility but the complete withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam. Johnson, for his part, felt that the North Vietnamese were awaiting the results of the 1968 Presidential election in the United States, whereupon they would know if the new American administration would be firm or lenient with them.

General William C. Westmoreland

Commonly known as “Westy”, the commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam had served as an officer in the Second World War, having graduated West Point in the mid 1930s. He would serve in North Africa, Italy and on the Western Front during that conflict. Immediately after the end of the war he attended jump school and commanded paratroopers in Korea, and after that served as superintendent of West Point, and had by this point gained a reputation as a “corporate executive in uniform”.

Westmoreland took command the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) in 1963, with the full confidence of both President Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. His priority as commander of American forces in Vietnam was to defeat the communist forces through attrition, bringing the overwhelming numerical and technological advantage of the united States Military to bear against them. This strategy would bear little obvious results beyond massive civillian casualties in South Vietnam, which would in turn combine with US casualties to galvanize the growing anti-war movement at home. His constant reports to congress, the White House and the American public about the sunny outlook of the war contrasted heavilly with the news coming out of the embattled country, as well as the ever-growing lists of US casualties. Despite this, “Westy” remained confident that his strategy was working toward victory, and by 1968 he believed that neither the NVA nor the Viet Cong were capable of major actions throughout the RVN.

The the NVA having besieged the US Marine base at Khe Sahn in early 1968, Westmoreland believed that this was intended to replicate the defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu, and therefore had begun to reinforce the I Corps area near the DMZ both to relieve the pressure on the Marine base and interdict any possible attacks from across the border by the NVA, but in general Westmoreland and MACV did not believe the enemy capable of a countrywide operation in early 1968.

Lieutenant General Foster C. LaHue

An Indiana native, the commander of Task Force X-Ray at the Phu Bai Combat Base had only been at the base for a few weeks. General LaHue had served as a marine officer in the Secodn World War as a member of the famous Marine Raiders on Guadalcanal as well as on New Georgia and the Admiralty Islands. Going into the Marine Corps Reserve after the end of the war, he was recalled to active duty in 1950, deploying to Korea that year with the 1st Marine Division. In March of 1967 he had been sent to Vietnam to take command of the Task Force X-Ray in Vietnam, a component of the 1st Marine Division. When General Westmoreland began redeploying his forces in Vietnam across the country in late 1967 Task Force X-Ray was moved from Thua Thien Province to Quang Tri, with headquarters moved to Phu Bai just south of Hue. Known as “Frosty” to his men, LaHue was a firm believer in the old adage of the greatest weapon being a marine riflemen, and was thoroughly confident his men could handle whatever the NVA or the VC could throw at them.

Lieutenant General John J. Tolson

John Tolson was an experienced airborne commander who had participated in combat jumps during the Second World War, including the recapture of Corregidor in early 1945, and was decorated for his actions. After the war he would become increasingly involved with Army Aviation, becoming a major advocate of the use of helicopters by the time he deployed to Vietnam in 1967. After going to Vietnam he took command of the 1st Cavalry Division, which was the first Army unit to begin the implementation of Tolson’s large scale air assault tactics.

1st Marine Division

The 1st Marine Division had been in Vietnam since 1965, and was subject to Westmoreland’s orders to redeploy forces northward toward the DMZ. Task Force X-Ray had been activated in late 1967 for that purpose, and was headquartered just south of Hue at Phu Bai. Task Force X-Ray had operational control of the 1st and 5th Marine Regiments, with CH46 helicopters as well as USAF fixed wing aircraft at the base. Artillery batteries were also positioned at Phu Bai, with the ability to fire into city in the (considered unlikely) event that such support would be needed.

1st Cavalry Division

The 1st Cavalry Division had also deployed to Vietnam in 1965, and had participated in the Battle of the Ia Drang Valley, which was the first major engagement of the American forces in Vietnam. Since then it had acquitted itself well in battle against the communists in various operations throughout South Vietnam before being redeployed to Camp Evans on Highway 1 north of Hue. The division mustered 2 brigades at Camp Evans, although a shortage of infrastructure needed to service aircraft at their new positions meant that the division would for the time being need to operate as an infantry formation.

101st Airborne Division

The 101st Airborne Division had also been ordered northward, and was still in the process of redeployment. In the event of trouble over Tet, the division’s 2nd Brigade was in the general area, soon to be deployed to the ARVN post at PK17 on Highway 1.